Psychological Determinism

There are two forms of psychological determinism. The first is orectic psychological determinism. According to this theory, we must always act according to our strongest desire. The second is rational psychological determinism. According to this theory, we must always act according to our best reason. In either case, this means that our actions are determined. Both of these theories are flawed. They do not stand up to introspective analysis, and they end up begging the question when they need to fix the holes in introspective analysis.

Psychological determinism usually proceeds by making the claim that one can introspectively discover that he or she always acts according to his or her strongest desire/reason. For instance, whenever I act, I have a series of desires/reasons and whichever is strongest is the one I follow. This process of examining my desires/reasons is the process of decision-making. If I did not act on the basis of my strongest desire/reason, then surely I must be acting according to some other desire/reason that is stronger, no? Therefore, it is unthinkable that I would act for some desire/reason that is not my strongest. Therefore, my actions are determined.

Let us begin with orectic psychological determinism. In introspective analysis, it is not clear that I always act according to my strongest desire. I can't think of any meaningful definition of "strong" for a desire other than "intense". However, I often have quite intense desires that I do not follow in place of less intense, more rational desires. For example, I might forgo a quite intense desire for a cigarette to satisfy a more complex, less intense desire like being healthy. Also, desires tend to be more intense depending on the proximity of the object. For instance, I might forgo a drink for which I have a very strong desire, to avoid a hangover tomorrow that is not vivid in my mind. It is at this point that orectic psychological determinists usually beg the question. Well, then, you must really desire to avoid the hangover more, and that must be your strongest desire. This, however, is only true if one has already accepted orectic psychological determinism. In other words, psychological determinism is being used to prove psychological determinism. It does not follow from introspective analysis.

Rational psychological determinism suffers from the same problem as orectic psychological determinism. As a matter of introspective analysis, I don't always act according to what my reason has determined to be the best reason. For instance, sometimes I will have those extra drinks and take the hangover tomorrow. This is in spite of knowing that the hangover will give me more pain than the drinks will give me pleasure, and knowing that the apparent desirability of the drinks is an illusion brought on by proximity. Nonetheless, I will do what I know full well is the worse action, both pragmatically and morally. Here, like the orectic psychological determinist, the rational psychological determinist usually begs the question. Then you must not really believe your own reasons; you must secretly believe that the hangover isn't really harmful. This, again, is begging the question. The rational psychological determinist is assuming rational psychological determinism in order to prove rational psychological determinism. It does not follow from introspective analysis.

As such, both forms of psychological determinism suffer from the same flaw: they do not follow from introspective analysis. When this is pointed out, psychological determinists will resort to begging the question, assuming their theory in order to prove it.

Introspection and Free Will

It is impossible to prove determinism a priori; there is nothing logically necessary about it. Scientific determinists tend to talk as though the question can be settled before examining any evidence, but scientific determinism is an empirical hypothesis that has not been proven. In fact, quantum mechanics seems to hint that matter may be indeterminate. This, of course, does not prove free will, but it leaves open the possibility.

Since the free will-determinism debate cannot be settled a priori, one useful approach is to use introspection. Introspection has its limits, but can be very helpful. Most importantly, it provides us with understanding of how we actually view the world without theory, before declaring some of those views illusions because they do not fit the theory. Rather, unless we have a very good reason to reject them, introspection should provide our default hypotheses.

The greatest introspective challenge to free will is psychological determinism. This theory asserts that we always act on our strongest desire or reason and are therefore always determined. I argue against this thesis in this article. To summarise, I argue that the thesis is question-begging, and requires stepping away from the introspective evidence in order to explain gaps in the evidence using the very theory that the evidence is intended to prove.

Rather, the introspective evidence favours free will. In a standard case of free agency, my reason tells me one thing that is best and my desires desire something(s) else more strongly. In this case, I will sometimes do what my reason says is best and in other cases I will do what my desires desire. There is no clear pattern to this, but I instead sometimes do one and sometimes do the other.

The cause of this cannot be the reason, or else I would always follow reason, nor is it the desires, or else I would always follow the desires. Nor is it some cause separate from me. When I make this decision, it seems as though I am making the decision. If the decision were being made from some external cause, the action would become dissociative. I would feel as though my body were moving in spite of myself, out of my control. However, the experience of making a decision is introspectively my decision and my action.

Since neither my reason nor my desire is the faculty behind these decisions, I postulate a third faculty. Normally, this faculty is called the "will". I identify with this will as much as, and perhaps more than, my reason and my desires, and it is clearly part of me. This "will" is introspectively free, as it is determined neither by the reason, nor the desires, nor by any external cause. Instead, the decision is my own, undetermined decision.

Free will should be the default position as it is the position that best approximates our introspective evidence. Deterministic positions are either derived from Nineteenth-Century physics or from introspective question-begging. Threfore, until some better argument against free will presents itself, we should believe that we have free will.

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Doctors and RCTs
Psychological Determinism
Introspection and Free Will
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Pleasure and Aggregation
On Modesty
Different Natures
Please and Thank You
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Remorse and Regret
On Coercion
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